Débat

Désolé, je ne suis pas un connaisseur de la 2nd guerre mondiale. Mais, pourquoi les Japonais ont attaqué Pearl Harbor. Est-ce qu'ils pensaient pouvoir vaincre les américains, était-ce une manière de trouver rapidemment l'issue de la guerre en s'attaquant au plus fort, voulaient-ils mettre terme à cette guerre en osant commettre une telle action ?

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La question est un gigantesque "What if"

Mais, on peut quand même penser que les allemands auraient eu du mal à vaincre les russes et que même dans ce cas, il y avait trop peu d'allemands pour occuper et tenir le monde entier, surtout avec les méthodes qu'ils employaient qui ne leur ralliaient pas les populations vaincues.

Without the more than 50.000 G.I. of the US divisions sent in the French North Africa in Nov. 1942 there would be no Torch and no landings.
As Montgomery was unable, then and later, to destroy the German and Italian Armoured Armee war in North Africa would go on until, maybe, autumn 1943 (and, maybe,m with an AXIS victory, but surely without a landing in Sicily or anywhere in the Med. as the season was too much advanced) and Stalin, pressed by the majority of the Kremlin, would have made a separate peace with Hitler not beyond Sept. 1943 when USSR touched the lowest point of her internal situation.

Without 50 US Army divisions available no landing in Normany or in any other place in 1944 or later. With only a dozen of Divisions the British would not do a damn except to remain sitting on their island like in 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 (the same British Army was not mobilized, calling the workers from the factories, with a following drop in industrial output, before Autumn 1943).

Without the US Navy the conventional U boat menace would not be defeated during Spring 1943 (it was a matter of numbers of escorts at sea. The British had a great eperience, doctrine ect., but number only annihilate and the Royal Navy had the strenght to do only an half of the job).

No the Yanks were perhaps not brilliant on the ground (the landings in Marocco, Kasserine, Gela, the Gustav line, Anzio, the Ardennes are all milestones of military blunders while Korea and Vietnam are simply confirmations that ther's something wrong, like in Irak today) but without them the game was over (and I believe strongly the British would have been, after the loss of Singapore in Feb. 1942, only too much happy to do a bargain with their German cousins, so racially minded like them, at the expenses, if possible, of the goddamed frogs and of the dagos).

Bye EC

pourquoi hitler etait obligé de declarer la guerre aux usa? Il s'assoie bien sur les traités d'habitude, et l'alliance avec le japon ne servait a rien.

Hitler avait tout intérêt à ce qu'un front dans le Pacifique se crée ...
Pour lui, c'était une " diversion " qui engageait les américains hors du théâtre d'opérations de l'Europe où il savait que tôt ou tard les USA interviendraient...

le problème n'est pas là : si hitler n'aurait pas declaré la guerre aux USA il n'aurait pas eu besoin de diversion. Il ne faut pas oublier que pour les américains laguerre contre le japon c'est la leur, celle en europe ce n'est pas si sur.

Hi Enrico,

I agree with your remarks on this vast "what if ", except perhaps on a point :
I strongly doubt that Stalin and Hitler remain each one on a neutral position. Their respective ideologies, in my opinion, make that they could not coexist a long time without conflict. Their respective objectives were to have Europe in their sphere, and early or late, each one would have tried to eliminate the rival...
What do you think about it ?
Is this another possible turn of this "What if " ?

Il ne faut pas oublier que pour les américains laguerre contre le japon c'est la leur, celle en europe ce n'est pas si sur.

Ca n'est pas tout à fait ce que j'ai retenu de mes lectures ( peut-être n'était-ce pas les bonnes :cry: ) car dans nombre de leurs propos les américains avaient fait de la lutte contre les nazis leur priorité dès qu'ils se sont engagés dans le conflit.

si hitler n'aurait pas declaré la guerre aux USA il n'aurait pas eu besoin de diversion.

C'est une hypothèse valable si il n'y avait pas eu d'alliance entre le Japon et l' Allemagne, et je ne pense pas que les américains aient pu rester neutres longtemps d'autant que leur engagement économique vers les anglais était loin d'être négligeable... Sans doute auraient-ils déclaré la guerre à toutes les forces de l'Axe si Hitler ne l'avait fait en premier...

Par ailleurs, il m'étonnerait que les américains laissent longtemps les coudées franches à Staline sur le continent européen...

C'est juste une opinion.

Salut Blackdeath (brr...),
Stalin and Hitler were surely going for each troath since 1919 until 1943, but after the Kharkov defeat of March 1943 I believe the intellectual will of the Soviets (with the lone exception of Stalin himself) was that there was no more a serious chance for a war of conquest of the West.
They had simply not the strenght for such an enterprise.
Stalin had to go on (someone had to pay for with his life, in that system, if USSR would have lost anything of the 1941 borders) and, after 1945, he always believed, in his old style, marxist vision, that war with the West would be only amater of time, but his cronies did not. The moral was that his Kremlin partners let him die as soon as they had such a chance some months before USSR was able (two years before the Americans) to have a "dry" series manifacturing H bomb which was, in comparison with the USA "A" ones, like a cannon in front of a revolver. With that weapon, after a new coming purge against his very last surviving original companions of the revolution, a Stalin in a better phisical form would have made war; after his death the rule was: anything except war until USSR collapsed.
Hitler too, according David Irving excellent studies, had admitted himself, in Summer 1943, that the war against USSR was unuseful, as his collegue Mussolini was saying since Dec. 1941. Der Fuhrer was, anyway, too much slow and, within th eend of Sept. 1943, he lose the last political chance to di an armistice with Moscow along the old 1941 border line. After it was only a matter of time, but the necessity and utility of war as a categorie in the East was over on both sides since Spring 1943.

Bte EC